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Men of all sorts take a pride to gird at me: the 
brain of this foolish-compounded clay, man, is not 
able to invent anything that tends to laughter, more 
than I invent or is invented on me: I am not only 
witty in myself, but the cause that wit is in other 
men. (Sir John Falstaff, in Henry IV Part 2, Act I, Scene 2) 
 
 Shakespeare recognized a distinction between something’s having a property in 
and of itself, and something else’s having the same property only when certain external 
conditions hold. So do we all. Plato distinguished between a fire’s being hot by its nature 
and another thing’s being hot because of the fire in it.2 Some basketball fans claim that 
Michael Jordan is a world-class player in and of himself, while Scottie Pippen plays 
world-class basketball only when he’s on the court with Jordan. Many people would 
agree that Paris, France is intrinsically worth living in, but McMurdo Station, Antarctica 
is not. And Lawrence Summers, the former president of Harvard University, suggested 
(to his eventual dismay) that while men have an aptitude for science intrinsically, women 
do not have this aptitude in the same way (assuming they have it at all). In short, in both 
philosophical and everyday contexts we recognize that things have some of their 
                                                
1 I would like to thank audiences at the Long Island Philosophical Society, the Claremont Colleges, 
University of Iowa, College of William & Mary and Oklahoma State University for comments and 
discussion, in particular Andrea Borghini, James Cain, Stephen Davis, Richard Fumerton, Paul Hurley, 
Amy Kind, Peter Kung, Alex Raczji, Peter Thielke, Masahiro Yamada and Charles Young. 
2 Plato, Phaedo (102b8-105c7), trans. H. Tredennick, in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., The Collected 
Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, N..J.: Princeton, 1961), 83-87; see also Charles Young, “A Delicacy in 
Plato’s Phaedo”, The Classical Quarterly, New Series vol. 38, No. 1 (1988), pp. 250-251. Michael 
Jacovides, “Cambridge Changes of Color”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 142-163, interprets 
John Locke (An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch, ed., (New York: Oxford, 
1700/1975): Book II Ch. 8 §19) as arguing that the changing color of porphyry in different lighting 
conditions is not a “real alteration” in the porphyry because it has its color extrinsically. 
properties intrinsically and others extrinsically, and also that the same property can be 
intrinsically by one thing and extrinsically by another. The primary goal of this paper is 
to outline an approach to distinguishing the ways in which things have properties along 
the “had intrinsically”/“had extrinsically” dimension. 
 I will call the target of my discussion the intrinsically/extrinsically (I-ly/E-ly) 
distinction, to contrast it with the intrinsic/extrinsic (I/E) distinction. The latter is a 
distinction between properties. The former is a distinction between ways in which 
particulars have properties; roughly, it registers the relative independence of a 
characteristic of an object from relevant changes in that object’s environment. The 
second goal of this paper is to show that we can and should explain the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction apart from how we classify properties under the I/E distinction. For this 
reason, I will avoid terms like “intrinsic properties” (which is ambiguous between the two 
distinctions) and even “intrinsic properties of objects” in favor of the precise, albeit 
sometimes awkward, “properties had intrinsically”. The third goal is to show the impact 
of this analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction on its relation to the I/E distinction. The result 
is a unified framework that illuminates the way we use the I-ly/E-ly distinction and 
explains the pervasive but philosophically puzzling phenomenon of cross-classification, 
in which properties classified as extrinsic can be had intrinsically and properties 
classified as intrinsic can be had extrinsically. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In section I, I motivate an explanation of 
the I-ly/E-ly distinction. In section II, I distinguish intrinsicness and extrinsicness from 
those notions captured in the essential/accidental, internal/external, and other nearby 
distinctions. In sections III, IV and V, I offer an analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction and a 
basic framework that explains its relation to the I/E distinction. My discussion proceeds 
from well-known a priori analyses (Kim, Langton and Lewis) in section III to an a 
posteriori analysis (Ellis) in section IV to a hybrid analysis that draws on psychological 
research in counterfactual reasoning in section V. I also suggest how this model applies 
to other distinctions that have motivated philosophical interest in the I/E distinction: the 
distinctions between real and mere Cambridge change, intrinsic and instrumental value, 
qualitative and numerical identity, and strong and global supervenience. In section VI, I 
elaborate on the basic model in the light of some puzzling cases. 
 
Section I. Motivating An I-ly/E-ly Distinction 
 Philosophical discussion of the I/E distinction often begins with an intuitively 
compelling difference that the subsequent formal analysis is intended to capture. Here’s a 
representative sample of the motivating intuitions: 
Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing’s having it (at a time) 
depends only on what that thing is like (at that time), and not on what any wholly 
distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like.3   
 
You know what an intrinsic property is: it’s a property a thing has (or lacks) 
regardless of what may be going on outside of itself.4 
 
A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and 
nothing else, is. Not so for extrinsic properties, though a thing may well have 
these in virtue of the way some larger whole is. The intrinsic properties of 
something depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of 
something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else.5  
 
                                                
3 Peter Vallentyne, “Intrinsic Properties Defined”, Philosophical Studies vol. 88 (1997): 209-219. 
4 Stephen Yablo, “Intrinsicness”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 26, No. 1 & 2 (Spring and Fall 1999): 479-505. 
5 David Lewis, “Extrinsic Properties” Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 197-200.  
Properties considered typical of each side of the distinction are then listed: for example, 
being an uncle or being six miles from a rhododendron, as opposed to having mass or 
being square.  
 It is not at all obvious, however, that the distinction motivated by these platitudes 
is the I/E distinction. A property that a thing has regardless of what’s going on outside 
itself is simply a property that it has intrinsically. Whether the property itself is intrinsic 
is logically a separate question. For example, one might have a Platonic model of 
properties as universals that exist independently from particulars, in which the properties 
are classified a priori as intrinsic or extrinsic, and the distinct ways in which particulars 
may instantiate these properties is another matter. The idea that the I/E distinction simply 
reflects the distinct ways in which properties are had by particulars requires a theory that 
connects the two distinctions in this way, for it is a theory which, unlike the Platonic 
theory, makes the distinction between the properties dependent on the distinction between 
the ways in which properties are had.  
 This non-Platonic theory is implicit in the way we think of essential properties 
and innate properties: each property-level distinction is just reflection of a distinction in 
the ways properties are had.6 One thing can be a mathematician essentially and another 
accidentally, and that is all; there is nothing further to be said in this regard about the 
property of being a mathematician. Because of this implicit policy, we are not tempted to 
think that something has a property essentially or innately because the property is 
                                                
6 Alternatively, one might say that there is no genuine property-level distinction in these cases, just a 
distinction in how properties are had. 
essential or innate (tout court). For there’s simply nothing more to being an essential 
property than being a property that is had essentially by some individual.7  
 If we treated the I/E distinction this way, an intrinsic property would just be a 
property that is had intrinsically by some individual and an extrinsic property just one 
that is had extrinsically by some individual. We would say that Falstaff is witty 
intrinsically and Prince Hal is witty extrinsically, and that Mr. Smith is an uncle 
extrinsically and has his mass intrinsically, and there would be nothing further to say 
about the properties of being witty, being an uncle or having mass. We could even 
explicitly reject the idea that properties are intrinsic or else extrinsic, since the distinction 
we would be drawing does not depend on the existence of a property-level distinction. 
And there would still be philosophical work to do, since we would have the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction to explain. 
 But we don’t treat the I/E distinction this way. We think the definition of a 
property determines whether the property is intrinsic or extrinsic, whereas the definition 
plays no such role in whether a property is essential, accidental, innate or acquired. As a 
result, the intuitive distinction expressed in the platitudes and our policy for clarifying it 
are at odds. The platitudes reflect an a posteriori distinction, but the analyses that are 
supposed to illuminate this distinction are a priori.  
 We can diagnose the problem more precisely. There already exists widespread 
recognition of the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions, called the “global” and “local” 
                                                
7 I do not mean to imply that essentialism is false; I am neutral on that issue. My point is simply that the 
locution “essential property” is not ambiguous in the way “intrinsic property” is; properties are essential (or 
not) relative to individuals that have them.  
distinctions. 8 It is also widely recognized that the relation between these distinctions 
cannot be straightforward. For example, we can start from the I/E (“global”) distinction, 
and hold that if a property is intrinsic, then all of its instances have it intrinsically; or we 
might start from the I-ly/E-ly (“local”) distinction, and hold that if anything has a 
property intrinsically, the property is intrinsic. The same would hold for extrinsicness.9 
The usual cases used to illustrate the lack of a straightforward relation are disjunctive 
properties, such as being made of tin or next to something made of tin, or being square 
and accompanied or red and lonely. Such designer properties are typically introduced as 
counterexamples to particular analyses of the I/E distinction. They are used to show, for 
example, that properties whose definitions are such that they count as intrinsic by the 
analysis have instances that intuitively are had extrinsically, and so therefore the 
properties should be classified as extrinsic, pace the analysis in question.  
 But the possibility is not even considered that any classification of how properties 
are had that is based purely on property definitions is inadequate. This possibility will not 
become evident by focusing on disjunctive properties that are designed by definition to 
act as counterexamples. It becomes immediately evident when we look at the practices 
that give rise to the motivating platitudes. For suppose one claimed that being witty is 
extrinsic because it means, or one stipulates that it means, “makes other people laugh”. It 
doesn’t follow that Falstaff isn’t witty intrinsically. Shakespeare knew what “being witty” 
                                                
8 I.L. Humberstone, “Intrinsic/Extrinsic”, Synthese vol. 108 (1996): 205-267 (see p. 206). I avoid this well-
known terminology because, as will become clear below, the I-ly/E-ly distinction is not just the I/E 
distinction applied to instances, nor is the I/E distinction just the I-ly/E-ly distinction applied to properties. 
9 The first option is called deriving a local notion from a global one, the second deriving a global one from 
a local one (Humberstone, ibid.; Brian Weatherson, “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2007 edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/. Weatherson claims the first is 
“undoubtedly true” but doubts the second due to disjunctive properties. I think both are false, for reasons 
explained in the text. 
meant when he distinguished Falstaff’s wit from everyone else’s in this way. Or suppose 
one claimed that shape is intrinsic because, given its definition, there’s no logical 
inconsistency in something’s having the shape it does in an otherwise empty world; it 
doesn’t follow that a stretched rubber band does not have its shape extrinsically.10 The 
obvious feature these cases share with many disjunctive properties is that, intuitively, 
some particulars have these properties intrinsically and others have them extrinsically. 
But what these cases reveal, and many disjunctive properties do not, is that property 
definitions are not invariably determining whether we think a property is had intrinsically 
or else extrinsically. Yet these are the practices that are used to motivate I/E analyses 
based on property definitions. 
 It is unlikely that we will understand the puzzling relation between any I/E 
distinction and the ways in which properties are had until we examine the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction more closely. We can start this task by expressing the original motivating 
intuitions as perhaps they always ought to have been: 
 You know what it is to have a property intrinsically: it’s for a thing to have (or 
 lack) a property regardless of what may be going on outside of itself. 
 
This claim unambiguously motivates an explanation of the I-ly/E-ly distinction. 
Representative examples of what we want to explain would include Mr. Smith’s being an 
uncle and Mr. Smith’s having mass, not being an uncle or having mass. It doesn’t follow 
that the I-ly/E-ly distinction will be wholly a posteriori. For the definition of a property 
presumably plays some role in determining whether its instances are had intrinsically or 
else extrinsically. The burden of this paper is to explain what else must be going on. 
                                                
10 The example is from Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s, 
2002): 51-54; see also Humberstone (op. cit.) and Bradford Skow, “Are shapes intrinsic?”, Philosophical 
Studies 133 (2007): 111-130. I discuss Ellis below.   
 Section II. A Brief Interlude: Other Distinctions. 
 Before analyzing the I-ly/E-ly distinction, it may be worthwhile to take a moment 
to clarify how having a property intrinsically or extrinsically differs from some of the 
other ways of having them: essentially or accidentally, internally or externally, or 
innately or by acquisition. Falstaff is not claiming that he was born witty, nor that he 
would cease to exist if he ceased being witty, nor is he locating his wit spatiotemporally – 
although he might done any or all of these things too.11 If we think of a property 
heuristically as a standard that all its instances meet, then ways of having a property are 
different ways of meeting that standard. We distinguish how an individual came to meet 
the standard to begin with (innately or via acquisition), whether it would still exist if it no 
longer met the standard (essentially or accidentally), whether it is met in virtue of 
something located inside the individual (internally or externally) and whether it would 
still be met in relevant counterfactual circumstances (intrinsically or extrinsically). A 
probable reason for highlighting when a thing has a property intrinsically is because 
properties had this way are considered dependable: they are not vulnerable to loss due to 
factors beyond the thing’s control – often, factors literally beyond the thing, many of 
which tend not to be in its control.12 Put the other way around, a property had intrinsically 
                                                
11Many of those discussing the I/E distinction take care to distinguish it from the essential/accidental 
distinction, although they may hold that essential properties are a subset of the intrinsics (e.g., Ellis, p.50) – 
more precisely, that the properties a thing has essentially are a subset of the properties it has intrinsically. 
This is not universal; Lynne Rudder Baker, in Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: 
Cambridge, 2000), p. 30, fn. 10, remarks that she “departs from the tradition in holding that not all essential 
properties are intrinsic.” 
12 Christine M. Korsgaard (“Two Distinctions in Goodness”, The Philosophical Review vol. 92, no. 2 (April 
1983): 169-195), while discussing G.E. Moore’s view of intrinsic value (“The Conception of Intrinsic 
Value”, Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922); Ethics (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford, 
1912), Ch. VII) explains on p. 175 that on that view intrinsic goodness “is dependent only on the thing’s 
intrinsic nature and is just as constant: so long as the thing remains what it is it has the same value: and the 
is one that is highly impervious to the impact of novel circumstances; from this point of 
view, having a property intrinsically implies an unfortunate inability to adapt. 
 Of course, in ordinary contexts we often use terms like “essentially”, “internally”, 
“innately” and “intrinsically” interchangeably (mutatis mutandis for “extrinsically” and 
the other contraries) even if the terms pick out different distinctions. For example, 
comedian Richard Pryor, who died on Dec. 10, 2005, was eulogized as follows:  
 Paul Mooney, a longtime friend and a frequent writing collaborator, said Mr. 
 Pryor’s skills “came from God”. “It was innate,” said Mr. Mooney, who called 
 himself Mr. Pryor’s “black writer” and lent the comic his first car, a 1952 Ford, 
 during his early days. “He could have been born in Japan and it still would have 
 been there. Geniuses just are.” (The New York Times, Dec. 13, 2005) 
 
A property can be had innately in that one is born with it, and yet not had intrinsically in 
that in relevant counterfactual circumstances one might lack it. Otherwise there would be 
no wasted natural talents. But however the terms might be used or confused in ordinary 
conversation, we are asking different questions when we want to know whether or not a 
thing acquired a property, whether or not it would cease to be what it is if it lost a 
property, whether or not a thing has a property by virtue of what is currently located 
inside itself, and whether or not it would still have a property in relevantly different 
counterfactual circumstances. 
 That said, there is a sense of “in and of itself” in which it is used to denote an 
internal/external (or interior/exterior) distinction, rather than a claim about independence. 
The two senses are distinct. The internal/external sense involves spatiotemporal claims, 
                                                                                                                                            
value is the same, of course, for everyone and so also objective.” Young (p. 250) describes Socrates as 
seeking an explanation of when an object has a property “its title to which is insecure, in the sense (to judge 
from 102b8-c8), that the object’s having the property is not guaranteed by its being what it is.”  
whereas the independence sense is essentially modal.13 A part can be had intrinsically by 
a whole in the internal sense, but not had intrinsically in the independence sense; 
similarly, a sniper’s bullet is had intrinsically in the internal sense, but not the 
independence sense, by her victim. The interior/exterior distinction is arguably prior to 
the independence sense, since many standard analyses of the I/E distinction essentially 
involve reference to objects that are distinct from, in that they share no parts with, the 
object that has the property in the way it does.14  
 In this paper, I will focus on the sense more widely associated with “in and of 
itself” – that of independence from relevant external circumstances. This is the sense that 
is of most concern in discussions of intrinsicness and extrinsicness. For example, when 
we want to know whether something has its value intrinsically, we are asking whether it 
would still be valuable in relevant counterfactual circumstances, not where its value is 
spatiotemporally located (assuming the latter question even makes sense). 
  
Section III. Explaining The I-ly/E-ly Distinction: Definitions. 
 An adequate account of the I-ly/E-ly distinction must explain what kinds of 
factors determine whether a property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically in any given 
                                                
13 There is also a sense of ‘internal’ that may be understood as ‘included in a thing’s nature’, which is 
roughly the same as the independence sense. I’ll discuss this sense of ‘internal’ in Section VI. 
14 Most also consider the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction distinct from the non-relational/relational distinction 
(but see Robert Francescotti, “How to Define Intrinsic Properties” Nous vol. 33 no. 4 (1999): 590-609), 
even though the two relations are often conflated in other contexts (e.g., Marc Lange, in An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Physics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), on p.18 characterizes the properties a thing has 
intrinsically as those which “depend only on itself, not on its relations to other things”, while “a typical 
non-intrinsic (“extrinsic”) property is the property of standing in a certain relation to something else.”) 
However, the non-relational/relational distinction is distinct from both senses of intrinsic. Every object is 
identical to itself, but an object stands in this relation in and of itself; the property of containing a spinal 
column is one a vertebrate has in and of itself, yet it involves a relation. Humberstone (pp. 212-13) argues 
persuasively that the non-relational/relational distinction is best understood as a distinction between 
predicates: since we can change 1-place predicates into 2 (or n) -place predicates at will (and vice versa), it 
is simple to make a property “involve a relation” or not. 
case, and how they do. It is helpful to consider an ordinary example to see what this task 
involves. When a basketball fan tells me that Jordan is a world-class basketball player in 
and of himself, I am not being told that this is so because he would still have that 
property at a world in which he exists in complete isolation. Such worlds are irrelevant.15 
I’m not told that Pippen is a world-class basketball player extrinsically because there are 
necessary existents; if there are any, they’re irrelevant. Most importantly, the role of the 
nature of being a basketball player – which by definition involves a team of five people – 
in determining how this property is had is not at all clear, since Jordan and Pippen are 
indistinguishable in this regard. There are, in short, implicit constraints on the 
counterfactual possibilities we normally consider when making I-ly/E-ly classifications, 
both in terms of the relevant sorts of objects and the relevant class of possible worlds.16 
An adequate account must explain these relevance parameters and how they are applied. 
 Standard I/E analyses provide a useful point of departure, since they aim to 
capture the notion of independence involved in intrinsicness and extrinsicness, and the I-
ly/E-ly distinction shares this core idea.17 To fix ideas, we can begin with Kim’s 
influential I/E distinction:    
(KE) F is extrinsic = df. Necessarily any object x has F only if some contingent     
      object wholly distinct from x exists. 
 
                                                
15 Experimental social psychologists have identified consistent constraints on the alternative possibilities 
that people normally entertain in counterfactual reasoning about events (Seelau et. al. 1995). I discuss these 
constraints in Section V; at this point, I ask the reader only to imagine herself in an ordinary context in 
which an I-ly/E-ly distinction, such as this one about Jordan, might be drawn. 
16 It is also likely that properties may be had I-ly or E-ly in degrees, as some recent analyses of the 
innate/acquired distinction also allow (e.g., Andre Ariew, “Innateness and Canalization”, Philosophy of 
Science, vol. 63 supplement: proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science 
Association, Part I: Contributed Papers (September 1996): S19-S27. I set this question aside here. 
17 I set aside definitions of intrinsicness in terms of duplication, whereby (roughly) an intrinsic property of a 
thing is one shared by all of its duplicates (e.g., Lewis “Extrinsic Properties”). Any mention of the I/E 
distinction in this paper can be analyzed in the idiom of duplication if the reader desires. 
 (KI) F is intrinsic = df. Possibly some object x has F although no contingent 
 object wholly distinct from x exists.18 
 
It is presupposed that the question of whether or not a property can be had by a thing that 
exists in an otherwise empty world depends entirely on the property’s definition and what 
logically follows from it. This assumption ensures that the notion of independence at the 
heart of the I/E distinction is logical (or conceptual) independence. We can swiftly obtain 
an I-ly/E-ly distinction by modifying Kim’s distinction as follows: 
 (KE-ly) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and necessarily x has F only if  
some contingent entity wholly distinct from x exists. 
 
 (KI-ly) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and it is possible both that x has  F and 
 no contingent entity y wholly distinct from x exists.19 
 
(KI) and (KE) do an admirable job of classifying many properties, but Kim’s analysis is 
widely considered vulnerable to a counterexample raised by Lewis involving the property 
of being lonely.20 A thing is accompanied iff it coexists with some wholly distinct 
contingent object, and lonely iff it is not accompanied. Lewis objects that being lonely is 
just as extrinsic as being accompanied, but (KI) classifies it as intrinsic. Intuitively, a 
                                                
18 Jaegwon Kim, “Psychophysical Supervenience”, Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 51-70, reprinted in his 
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge, 1993), 175-193. I use 
Lewis’s (“Extrinsic Properties”) version of Kim’s original distinction, which Kim expressed as follows: 
 (i) G is rooted outside the objects that have it = df. necessarily any object x has G only if some 
contingent object wholly distinct from x exists; 
 (ii) G is internal = df. G is neither rooted outside times at which it is had nor outside the objects 
that have it. 
Vallentyne also provides a more concise version of Kim’s definition: 
 P is intrinsic = df. Px is compatible with ~Ax, 
where A is the property of being accompanied by at least one distinct contingent object; and what’s not 
intrinsic is extrinsic. (See also Humberstone, p. 229). Vallentyne explains the intuition behind Kim’s 
definition of intrinsic as follows: “The intuitive idea is that P can be had by an object even in a world with 
no other distinct objects.” That may be true of Kim’s or Vallentyne’s intuitions; it is unlikely to be true of 
Shakespeare’s or Summers’. At the very least, none of the intuitions expressed in the platitudes requires it 
to be true that a property I have intrinsically is one that I would have in an otherwise empty world. 
19 Derk Pereboom, in “Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist”, Synthese vol. 88 (1991): 341-358, 
offers a local version of Kim’s definition: F is an extrinsic property of x iff x’s having F logically entails or 
rules out there being a contingent thing wholly distinct from x; otherwise a property is had intrinsically. 
However, this definition is closer to (LLE-ly), described below, rather than (KE-ly). 
20 “Extrinsic Properties”, pp. 198-199. 
thing’s being lonely depends on what the world is like; since the core idea of intrinsicness 
is contextual independence, the property ought to be classified as extrinsic. 
 However, it is not clear that being lonely is a counterexample to (KI), as opposed 
to (KI-ly). The definition of being lonely is such that it gets classified as an intrinsic 
property by (KI). To consider this classification wrong and (KI) inadequate on the basis 
of how things have their properties is to assume, inconsistently, that we do not apply (KI) 
and (KE) based entirely on property definitions. It may not be a mark in (KI)’s favor that 
it yields intrinsic properties that are had extrinsically, but (KI) is not contradicted by this 
fact given how the I/E distinction is drawn. (KI-ly), in contrast, classifies a thing’s being 
lonely as a property it has intrinsically, and this does seem incorrect. (By analogy: S’s 
being an only child does not just depend on S.) (KE-ly) is also in trouble. (KE-ly) says 
that if a thing has a property extrinsically, it cannot be the only contingently existing 
thing. But anything that is lonely can be the only contingently existing thing. We can 
consistently take Lewis’s counterexample as an objection to (KI-ly) and (KE-ly) because 
differences in how things have their properties are precisely what these analyses are 
meant to capture.  
 In response to the alleged counterexample to (KI) and (KE), however, Langton 
and Lewis (1998) propose an influential alternative I/E analysis based on Kim’s: 
 (LLI) F is intrinsic = df. Fx is compatible with Ax and with ~Ax, and so is ~Fx, 
 
where A is the property of being accompanied and ~A is the property of being lonely, 
defined as above;  and what’s not intrinsic is classified as extrinsic.21 By this definition, 
                                                
21 Rae Langton and David Lewis, “Defining ‘Intrinsic’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 
58 no. 2 (June 1998): 333-345; see also David Lewis, “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research vol. 63 no. 2 (2001), Special Symposium: Defining Intrinsic: 381-398. In the 
text I use Vallentyne’s version of (LLI); Langton and Lewis express this conception, but do not display the 
an intrinsic property is one that is independent of accompaniment or loneliness, and to be 
independent of  accompaniment or loneliness is for these four cases to be logically 
possible as determined by the property’s definition: there can be an accompanied 
individual that has F, a lonely individual that has F, an accompanied individual that lacks 
F and a lonely individual that lacks F. Being lonely comes out extrinsic by this analysis, 
since its definition entails that there cannot be an accompanied individual that has it or a 
lonely individual that lacks it. 
 Unfortunately, the success of this I/E distinction does not carry over entirely to 
the corresponding I-ly/E-ly distinction: 
 (LLI-ly) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and x’s having F is compatible with 
 x’s having A and with x’s having ~A. 
  
 (LLE-ly) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and x’s having F is not compatible 
 with either x’s having A or else x’s having ~A. 
 
(These analyses are simplified because in I-ly/E-ly judgments there is no need to consider 
how other objects might have the property.) By these definitions, a thing’s being lonely is 
correctly classified as a property it has extrinsically. (LLE-ly) also avoids the problem 
that beset (KE-ly), for an object’s being the only existing thing is plainly incompatible 
with its also not being the only contingently existing thing. Nevertheless, these analyses 
fail to capture many of the I-ly/E-ly classifications we make. If Falstaff is witty in and of 
himself and Prince Hal is not, this is not because we judge that Falstaff would have this 
property in an otherwise empty world and Prince Hal wouldn’t: by incorporating A and 
                                                                                                                                            
definition in this (or any) form. Their analysis is subject to two restrictions: it does not apply to impure, or 
non-qualitative, properties (properties that contain reference to particular objects, places or times) nor to 
disjunctive properties. Langton and Lewis also distinguish between basic intrinsics, which are natural 
properties, and non-basic intrinsics, which are disjunctive properties or their negations. These are property-
level restrictions on the application of (LLI) or (LLE) which do not affect my analysis of the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction; disjunctive properties are (often) just properties that can be had either way. 
~A in the definitions, (LLI-ly) and (LLE-ly) require us to consider worlds that are 
irrelevant to the distinction Falstaff drew between himself and Prince Hal. Nor does it 
explain how he did draw the distinction given what is required by definition to be witty, 
since Falstaff and Prince Hal are alike in this regard. In short, using (LLE) we may 
(correctly) classify the property of being witty as extrinsic based on its definition, but 
(LLE-ly) gives us no clue as to how this extrinsic property might coherently be had 
intrinsically. The cross-classification problem remains as puzzling as ever. 
 But we can begin to address the problem with slight revisions of the definitions of 
being lonely and being accompanied: one is lonely if one is the only relevant contingently 
existing thing at a relevant world, and one is accompanied if one co-exists with the 
relevant contingently existing object(s) at a relevant world. In nearly all cases (we will 
see degenerate cases below), relevantly lonely worlds are those that lack relevant external 
objects. These revisions explicitly raise the issues of how we determine which objects 
must go missing for something to be relevantly lonely (as opposed to lonely tout court, 
which we may call Lewis-lonely) and how we determine which worlds are relevant if we 
do not (or almost never) consider the logically possible worlds where an object is Lewis-
lonely. We can make these relevance parameters explicit in a set of revised definitions: 
 (I-ly) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and x’s having F is compatible, in the
 relevant set of possible worlds, with x’s having AR and with x’s having ~AR; 
  
 (E-ly) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and x’s having F is not compatible, in 
 the relevant set of possible worlds, with x’s having AR or else x’s having ~AR, 
 
where AR is the property of being relevantly accompanied and ~AR that of being 
relevantly lonely.22 This analysis does not yet explain, but only makes room for 
                                                
22 Some recent analyses of the I/E distinction build relevance implicitly into their I/E definitions 
(Vallentyne; David Denby, “The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties”, Mind vol. 115 
explaining, how Falstaff can be intrinsically witty and Prince Hal extrinsically witty, and 
how a stretched rubber band can have its shape extrinsically and a hardened steel band 
can have the same shape intrinsically. But what determines the relevance parameters in 
(I-ly) and (E-ly)? 
 
Section IV. Explaining the I-ly/E-ly Distinction: Relevance, Step One 
 Consider again the claim that Michael Jordan is a world-class basketball player in 
and of himself, while Scottie Pippen is a world-class player only when he’s on the court 
with Jordan. An ordinary fan may make coherently make this claim even though both 
men are alike (at times) in being world-class basketball players; even though she knows 
that no one can play basketball without four other people; even though what’s needed for 
Jordan and Pippen to exist implies that many other things exist at every possible world 
she considers; and even though she does not even consider a Lewis-lonely world as 
relevant to her distinguishing them.23 How does she do this? How do we? In what 
follows, I will argue that the relevance parameters in (I-ly) and (E-ly) follow the same 
heuristics that constrain the relevant alternatives considered in ordinary counterfactual 
reasoning. This is because the I-ly/E-ly distinction serves an explanatory purpose that 
depends on such reasoning for its success. Since these constraints reflect our empirical 
knowledge, empirical facts, not just property definitions, play an essential role in drawing 
this distinction. 
                                                                                                                                            
(2006): 1-17), but do not explain what determines relevance. Such analyses are roughly analogous to (LLI) 
and (LLE) when “relevantly-lonely” and “relevantly-accompanied” are substituted into the original 
formulas and left unexplicated. 
23 The latter claim is supported by empirical research on counterfactual reasoning discussed in section V. 
 Before explaining the Jordan/Pippen (or Falstaff/Hal) examples, consider the 
superficially simpler case of Mr. Smith’s being an uncle. We judge that Mr. Smith has 
this property extrinsically; his being an uncle is not compatible with his being relevantly 
lonely. In this case it seems clear that the definition of being an uncle determines the 
relevant external objects. If offspring of Mr. Smith’s sibling or siblings did not exist, he 
would not have the property. Although this case seems straightforward, if not trivial, 
there are two unexplained features that bear emphasis. First, when making our judgment 
we don’t consider those worlds where Mr. Smith is female, even though these are also 
worlds where he wouldn’t have the property. But the definition didn’t require us to 
restrict our counterfactual reasoning to those worlds where Mr. Smith is just as he is (and 
everything else is just as it is) except the relevant external objects are absent. So what 
determines the class of relevant worlds? Second, our judgment about Mr. Smith’s being 
an uncle may seem trivial because it is not logically possible for any male who does not 
have siblings with offspring to be an uncle. Anyone who knows the definition knows this 
immediately – it just follows from the definition that he has this property extrinsically, 
one might say. But when considering the I-ly/E-ly distinction, our concern is only with 
whether Mr. Smith would be an uncle in the relevant counterfactual circumstances; it is 
not with what we think we can infer about how other objects have a property just from 
the definition of the property. If such inferences were always valid, there would be no 
distinction between Falstaff and Hal to explain. So why does the inference fail generally? 
And why does it go through in this case? I will return to these questions below. 
 Now consider a physical object’s shape. Shape is usually classified as an intrinsic 
property, but most physical objects (unlike the shapes of some abstract objects) have their 
shapes extrinsically.24 The actual shapes of physical objects partly depend on the external 
physical forces acting on them. A stretched rubber band illustrates this clearly, but even 
unstretched bands are subject to external stresses. So if shape is an intrinsic property, it is 
an intrinsic property that is had extrinsically in many actual cases.25 Resistance to this 
claim does not stem from lack of basic familiarity with physical theory, since it is 
common to classify mass as intrinsic and weight as extrinsic, presumably because the 
latter depends in part on gravitational forces. Instead, it seems symptomatic of the 
assumption that property definitions determine not just whether a property is intrinsic or 
else extrinsic, but also how properties are had. It is quite true that (e.g.) being a square is 
being a plane figure with four equal sides and four equal angles, and that based on this 
definition being a square will be classified as an intrinsic property by standard I/E 
definitions. But the present discussion is about actual squares, and the problem with 
actual squares having their shapes the way we know they do is that it confounds a purely 
a priori approach to the I-ly/E-ly distinction.26 
                                                
24 It is possible that in classifying shape as intrinsic the intended interpretation of “intrinsic” is the 
“internal” sense. For example, Lewis (“Extrinsic Properties”) declares that “some properties of things are 
entirely intrinsic, or internal, to the things that have them: shape, charge, internal structure”. However, this 
would at best be an equivocation, since the subsequent definition motivated by the case of shape explicates 
intrinsicness in terms of logical independence of external circumstances (or duplication), not 
spatiotemporal location.  
25 So apparently is molecular structure, in a molecular model consistent with both quantum mechanics and 
observation (R. Wooley, “Must a Molecule Have a Shape?”, Journal of the American Chemical Society 
100 (1978): 1073-1078 and “The Molecular Structure Conundrum” Journal of Chemical Education 62 
(1985): 1082-1084; Pierre Claverie and Simon Diner, “The Concept of Molecular Structure in Quantum 
Theory: Interpretation Problems”, Israel Journal of Chemistry vol. 19 (1980): 54-81; Steven Weininger, 
“The Molecular Structure Conundrum: Can Classical Chemistry be Reduced to Quantum Chemistry?” 
Journal of Chemical Education 61 (1984): 939-944; Robin LePoidevin, “Space and the Chiral Molecule”, 
in Nalini Bhushan and S. Rosenfeld, eds., Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on 
Chemistry (Oxford: Oxford, 2000): 129-142. 
26 This may explain Ellis’s complaint (p. 51) that philosophers “have not succeeded in explicating a concept 
[of intrinsic] that is of much relevance to the theory or practice of science.”  
 To address this problem, Ellis proposes an I/E distinction based on what he calls 
causal independence, rather than logical (definition-based) independence. Stated in terms 
of an I-ly/E-ly distinction, the essence of his proposal is as follows: 
 (CI-ly) x has F causally-intrinsically iff x has F, F is posited by physical theory T, 
 and Fx is compatible with the absence of relevant properties and laws posited by 
 T; 
 
and what’s not had CI-ly is had CE-ly.27 The idea is that while a physical object typically 
has its actual shape in a way that depends in part on external forces acting on it, the way 
in which they have these shapes is distorted from the point of view of our theoretical 
models. Within these models, the theoretical analogues of actual things have their shapes 
in an undistorted way – that is, in a way not dependent on the relevant forces. This is the 
way actual things would have their shapes if they were not subject to the forces posited 
by the model. In short, to have a shape causally-intrinsically is to have a shape in an 
undistorted way, where what’s undistorted is determined by the model. 
 Actual physical objects can have their shapes causally-intrinsically, although 
simply having a shape like that of the relevant model-theoretic analogue is not sufficient; 
it must have that shape in an undistorted way.  To use Ellis’s example, a strip of hardened 
steel shaped the way a given rubber band is shaped when stretched “would have this 
shape naturally, independently of any accidental forces. Therefore, in the causal sense of 
‘intrinsicality’, the actual shape of a body may or may not be the same as its intrinsic 
shape.” That is, the steel band, but not the rubber band, has its shape in an undistorted 
way, because if the relevant forces were removed the steel band would still have its shape 
                                                
27 Ellis does not display a definition, so (CI-ly) is based on his remarks. This I-ly/E-ly form may best 
express Ellis’s intent, since he claims: “Intrinsicality in the causal sense is therefore not a property of 
properties, as many of those who have tried to explicate a logical concept of intrinsicality have supposed. It 
has more to do with the role that the property has in physical theory.” He also applies his model to rest 
mass (the mass the object would have were it not in motion relative to us) and a particle’s spin. 
but the rubber band would not.28 Again, we need not consider the steel band’s shape in a 
Lewis-lonely world, only in a relevantly lonely world. 
 The importance of Ellis’s proposal in this context is that it provides a model of 
how the relevance parameters in (I-ly) and (E-ly) can be determined other than by 
definitions. In other words, (CI-ly) is just a special case of (I-ly) in which the relevant 
external objects are fixed by physical theory. It is still the case that the definition of being 
square determines what is necessary and sufficient for being square; by this definition, 
and (LLI), being square counts as an intrinsic property. But the definition does not 
determine what’s relevant to a thing’s being square intrinsically or else extrinsically. In 
the case of physical objects, physical theory tells us what’s relevant to whether a thing 
has its shape in one way or the other. In general, the relevant external objects may be 
determined by a theoretical model of the system’s behavior, including but not limited to 
the models of basic physical theory.29  
 This insight will not yet get us out of the woods. For consider again the case of 
Michael Jordan. Being a world-class basketball player, unlike having a particular shape, 
is not a property that is posited by physical theory or any other theoretical model, so 
Ellis’s proposal seems inapt. Yet the definition of being a world-class basketball player, 
unlike that of being an uncle, also does not determine which objects or worlds are 
relevant to drawing the distinction between Jordan and Pippen. For the fan who draws 
this distinction can surely infer from its meaning, as we do, that no one could be a 
                                                
28 Its having its shape in an undistorted way also depends on the relevant forces not being present; so the 
steel band would have to have the shape its theoretical analogue has both when the forces are present and 
when they are not in order to have it causally-intrinsically. (CI-ly) would need to be modified for this. 
29 It is worth emphasizing the fact that Ellis’s proposal can be incorporated naturally into my account. In 
the literature on the I/E distinction, his contribution is either ignored or mentioned briefly only to be set 
aside.  
basketball player in a world that lacks at least four other people. But she doesn’t thereby 
infer that no one can have this property intrinsically. She – like Shakespeare, like 
Summers, like all of us in many ordinary contexts – draws the distinction in spite of this 
logical fact. But if what’s relevant to drawing her distinction is not determined by a 
definition nor by a theoretical model, we still lack an adequate explanation of how the I-
ly/E-ly distinctions are drawn. 
 Since the Jordan/Pippen case was presented as a typical example of the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction, one may be tempted to think that that the I-ly/E-ly distinctions we make are 
either too vague or unsystematic or even incoherent to theorize about. If so, then the fact 
that the I/E distinction is a priori is a relief – although it would still follow that we should 
not necessarily judge a candidate I/E distinction by whether it captures intuitions about 
how properties are had. But this pessimistic conclusion about the I-ly/E-ly distinction is 
unwarranted.  
 
Section V: Explaining the I-ly/E-ly Distinction: Relevance, Step Two 
 Turn again to the case of Falstaff and Hal, which is parallel to the Jordan/Pippen 
case. Suppose being witty is defined as “makes other people laugh”. How can Falstaff be 
intrinsically witty and Prince Hal not? How can Falstaff be intrinsically witty at all, given 
what is necessary for being witty? 
 There is a very simple explanation. What would distinguish their wittiness is a 
quality of Falstaff – a disposition – that is the source of his wittiness and the cause of 
wittiness in others. Falstaff’s being witty would be compatible with his being relevantly 
lonely, because Falstaff would have this disposition even if other people did not exist.30 
In the relevantly lonely worlds he would still be witty, but his wittiness would not be 
manifested. We may not accept his boast, but we certainly understand it: we understand 
the distinction that Shakespeare is drawing and how it is possible for Falstaff to be witty 
even at the relevantly lonely worlds. Similarly, the sports fan might say Jordan is a 
world-class basketball player intrinsically because he would still have the disposition to 
play as he does at a relevantly lonely world – where, for example, he’s alone on the court 
– even though it would not be manifested. In short, having a property intrinsically is, in 
some cases, having another property intrinsically – in this case, a disposition – that 
explains why the object has the first property at all.31 
 But is this simple explanation the right one, in these ordinary cases? Plausibly, 
yes. It is standard procedure to seek explanations of observable phenomena in terms of 
other, usually more basic, phenomena. This explanatory tendency is not limited to 
scientific pursuits. The same approach is reflected in the thought that Jordan has some 
underlying cause of his talent; the fan merely adds that this source is something he 
possesses in and of himself. It is also revealed in Summers’ distinction between those 
who have an intrinsic aptitude for science from those who do not: he drew the distinction 
to explain why there are relatively few women in the upper reaches of science. We 
needn’t posit dispositions. We don’t think Paris, France has a disposition that makes it 
worth living in intrinsically. But to someone who distinguishes Paris from McMurdo 
                                                
30 In effect, Falstaff himself is the relevant object for being or not being witty. He can both co-exist with the 
relevant object, and so be relevantly accompanied, and be the only relevant object, and so be relevantly 
lonely. In this degenerate case, the distinction between being relevantly accompanied and being relevantly 
lonely collapses, since being accompanied just by oneself is equivalent to being lonely. Relative to Hal, 
Falstaff is the relevant external object, and the usual accompanied/lonely distinction revives. Since this is 
the usual case, I will typically write of “relevant external objects” in the text. 
31 This is not circular: dispositions can also be had I-ly or E-ly. See also section VI. 
Station in this way, some ineffable je ne sais quoi explains why Paris is worthwhile being 
in independently of any further reasons we might have for being there. 
 The important point is that I-ly/E-ly distinctions are typically drawn in order to 
provide explanations, however rudimentary or proleptic, of how a thing has its properties. 
By an explanation, I mean nothing more fancy than an answer to a why-question.32 Such 
explanations may involve positing an additional property (or properties), of which 
dispositions are just a well-known type, that are not required by definition for having a 
property but which serve the purpose of explaining how the property is had. In such cases 
it is the way in which the explanans property is had, or are thought to be had, that 
determines whether an explanandum property is had intrinsically or else extrinsically, 
whether the explanandum property itself is classified as intrinsic or else extrinsic. In these 
cases, the inference from what is required by definition for having a property to the way 
in which any individual has that property can fail. It is also plausible that when no further 
explanation can be given – for example, when we have explained how the disposition that 
explains Falstaff’s wittiness is had – the ultimate explanans property is had intrinsically 
or else extrinsically as determined by its definition or by a theoretical model, likely in 
physics. So in principle there is no need to list further ways of determining the relevant 
objects in (I-ly) and (E-ly). However, that analysis does require the following revision: 
 (I-ly*) x has F intrinsically = df. x has F, and (i) x’s having F is compatible, in the
 relevant set of possible worlds, with x’s having AR and with x’s having ~AR, or 
 (ii) x has G intrinsically, and x’s having G explains x’s having F. 
  
                                                
32 In particular, the explanations I have in mind need not satisfy models of scientific explanation, and they 
are typically incomplete relative to scientific or philosophical standards of completeness. For example, 
Summers’s suggestion regarding the scientific aptitude of women was an answer to the following question: 
Why are there so few women in the highest ranks of science? The why-questions that motivate the other I-
ly/E-ly examples (or answers) I’ve used throughout the text are similarly straightforward.  
 (E-ly*) x has F extrinsically = df. x has F, and (i) x’s having F is not compatible, 
 in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x’s having AR or else x’s having ~AR; 
 or (ii) x has G extrinsically, and x’s having G explains x’s having F. 
 
With this analysis, plus the claim that the I-ly/E-ly distinction plays an explanatory role, 
we are in a position to explain the I-ly/E-ly distinction and its relation to the I/E 
distinction in a way that solves the puzzle of cross-classification. 
 First, the idea that the I-ly/E-ly distinction is drawn for explanatory purposes 
allows us to explain how the relevant sets of possible worlds are determined. As with the 
I/E distinction, the core of the I-ly/E-ly distinction is the idea of independence from the 
environment, cashed out in counterfactual terms. But because of its explanatory function, 
the counterfactuals that support the I-ly/E-ly distinction will be constrained to those 
alternatives that are relevant to the proposed explanation. Moreover, we can explain these 
constraints if we recognize this reasoning as just a special case of ordinary counterfactual 
reasoning, which follows robust constraints on which counterfactual possibilities are 
entertained. These general constraints can explain how we limit the set of worlds to a 
contextually relevant class in the special case of drawing I-ly/E-ly distinctions. 
 Following Kahneman and Tversky, psychologists have sought to isolate the 
parameters that govern and constrain everyday counterfactual reasoning and develop 
cognitive models that explain these regularities.33 The constraints concern which 
                                                
33 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “The simulation heuristic”, in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, 
eds., Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (New York: Cambridge): 201-208; Daniel 
Kahneman and Dale T. Miller, “Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives”, Psychological 
Review vol. 93 no. 2 (1986): 136-153; Ruth M.J. Byrne, “Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about 
what might have been”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences vol. 6 no. 10 (October 2002): 426-431; Eric P. 
Seelau, Sheila M. Seelau, Gary L. Wells and Paul D. Windschitl, “Counterfactual Constraints”, in Neal J. 
Roese and James M. Olson, eds., What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual 
Thinking, (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995); Ahogni N’gbala and Nyla R. Branscombe, 
Nyla R., “Mental Simulation and Causal Attribution: When Simulating an Event Does Not Affect Fault 
Assignment”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 31 (1995): 139-162; Gary L. Wells and Igor 
Gavanski, “Mental Simulation of Causality”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology vol. 56, no. 2 
alternative possibilities are considered, which facts are more easily mutable, and which 
are more likely to be mutated. One source of constraint appears to be the purpose the 
reasoner has for reasoning counterfactually.34 A primary purpose is to explain how and 
why something occurred. By entertaining alternative possibilities, we may seek to isolate 
necessary causes (John’s father’s stopping to chat with neighbors on the way to picking 
John up from school) and sufficient causes (a drunken driver’s hitting John while he was 
waiting to be picked up). Other goals include assigning responsibility and blame, 
providing consolation to others and oneself, amplifying negative and positive affective 
responses, and guiding future behavior. (These need not be mutually exclusive.)  
 Besides the conscious purposes we may have, there are constraints that operate 
automatically in that without conscious effort they sharply restrict the infinite range of 
alternative possibilities that could be entertained to a very small set. The natural-law 
constraint includes (“folk”) knowledge of basic physical, chemical and biological laws 
and facts. Possibilities with mutated natural facts are almost never considered in normal 
discourse. For example, when mutating the event of a plane crash, we never consider “if 
only it had fallen up”. (This possibility would also violate the purpose constraint, on the 
assumption that we are trying to isolate a sufficient cause of the crash or assign fault.) On 
the other hand, when we seek to explain the 1986 Challenger disaster, subjects commonly 
consider “if only the O-rings had been checked”. 
                                                                                                                                            
(1989): 161-69. The experimental social psychological research focuses on counterfactual reasoning about 
events (often those that evoke regret or other affective responses); quite plausibly, the same constraints 
apply to counterfactual reasoning about objects. Kahneman and Miller explicitly link their concept of 
mutability – a modal notion referring to that feature of some aspects of reality under which these aspects 
are more or less easily altered in counterfactual reasoning than others – to David Lewis’s analysis of 
counterfactuals (Counterfactuals (Blackwell and Harvard, 1983)), in which some possible worlds are 
“closer” or involve “smaller” changes. 
34 Here I largely follow Seelau et al., “Counterfactual Constraints”.  
 The availability constraint involves factors that make certain mutations more 
likely than others. For example, we are more likely to mutate exceptions rather than 
normal events (e.g., Tom’s taking a new route home when he got into a crash, rather than 
his usual route), actions rather than inactions (e.g., subjects judge that Dick, who is 
unhappy after having transferred to a new college, feels more regret than Harry, who is 
unhappy after not having transferred), aspects of reality over which we may have control 
rather than those that we do not (e.g., the O-rings), and more recent events rather than 
those earlier in a series (e.g., the last missed field goal in a football game that was lost by 
2 points). In general, an event or aspect that is contextually salient is more available for 
mutation. 
 The natural-law, availability and purpose constraints can always be violated, and 
regularly are in science fiction and philosophical discussion. But we see clear evidence of 
them in the ordinary I-ly/E-ly distinctions discussed above. In the case of Mr. Smith’s 
being an uncle, we do not bother to consider the world where he is female, as this would 
violate the natural-law constraint; our omission also makes sense if we are consciously 
focusing on the definition in order to identify the external objects that might affect his 
having the property. We also do not to consider being an uncle the sort of property that 
calls for further explanation. Jordan’s talent, on the other hand, does cry out for 
explanation: why is his level of play so extraordinary? Yet when the sports fan 
distinguishes Jordan from Pippen, she does so in a way that also follows the constraints. 
For example, she does not consider worlds where everyone else is 10 feet tall. Such 
worlds would not only violate the natural-law constraint; they would obviate her 
attempted explanation of Jordan’s talent and her attempt to assign him full credit for his 
success. The same goes for Falstaff when he seeks to credit himself for his wittiness: 
worlds where he couldn’t be witty, for whatever reason, are simply not relevant. In all 
these cases, the person drawing the distinction can be wrong; the I-ly/E-ly distinction is 
not subjective (at least, that claim goes beyond what I have argued for here). But the 
distinction that is drawn reflects the purposes of the person drawing it, even if it can be 
challenged. 
 Second, we have a natural explanation of the puzzle of cross-classification, when 
a property classified as extrinsic (such as being witty) can be had intrinsically, and a 
property classified as intrinsic (such as being square) can be had extrinsically. Cross-
classification arises when something’s having a property that counts as intrinsic by 
definition is explained by its having another property extrinsically; mutatis mutandis for 
extrinsic properties that are had intrinsically. The following diagram (fig.1) illustrates this 
relation between the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions: 
 Fig. 1: A Framework for the I/E and I-ly/E-ly Distinctions35 
 
The overall account of the I-ly/E-ly distinction remains fairly simple, however: (i) 
definitions and empirical theory each can determine the relevant external objects in (I-
ly*) and (E-ly*); (ii) empirically-determined constraints on ordinary counterfactual 
reasoning reliably determine the relevant worlds in (I-ly*) and (E-ly*); (iii) cross-
                                                
35 Being Escher-shaped is having the shape of an Escher-drawn object that cannot be had by an actual 
physical object. Although I use Langton and Lewis’s I/E distinction to illustrate, the reader may plug in her 
favorite analysis. For example, Gene D. Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon (“Intrinsicality 
without Naturalness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 70, no. 2 (March 2005): 326-350) 
propose a two-tiered account of the I/E distinction – superficially similar to this element of the present I-
ly/E-ly account -- to eliminate Langton and Lewis’s reliance on the natural/unnatural property distinction. 
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classification between the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions can arise when something’s 
having one property is explained by its having another; (iv) because of (iii), we cannot 
invariably infer from what is required by definition to have a property to how it is had in 
any particular case.36 I should note that despite the emphasis on explanation in this 
model, the I-ly/E-ly distinction itself is metaphysical. The distinction matters to us 
because of its explanatory utility. Merely ascribing a property to a thing to explain its 
behavior is often insufficient to provide a satisfactory explanation; one reason for this is 
because other things can have that same property but not behave the same way. 
 This account does not require us to change how we draw the I/E distinction. We 
may still classify properties as intrinsic or extrinsic depending on their definitions, as 
current I/E analyses do, although in this case single-case cross-classifications are not 
necessarily counterexamples to a proposed I/E analysis. Nevertheless, we might consider 
a better analysis to be one that yields fewer cross-classifications, or that best distinguishes 
those cases where cross-classification is very rare or non-existent. Note that the cross-
classification issue is just the problem (not always recognized as such) of how to classify 
what have been called “mixed” cases in the literature. Kim’s I/E analysis classifies a 
property as intrinsic if it is logically possible for it to be had intrinsically (i.e., it can be 
had in a Lewis-lonely world). Most other analyses classify a property as extrinsic if it is 
logically possible for it to be had extrinsically; disjunctive properties with “mixed” 
instances, such as being square or (Lewis-) accompanied, are routinely classified as 
                                                
36If divine power were invoked to explain Jordan’s prowess, the distinction between him and Pippen would 
not be an I-ly/E-ly distinction, but a divinely-inspired/not divinely-inspired distinction. But while Jordan 
would have his prowess extrinsically, it would not be because of the definition of being a world-class 
basketball player, but because of his dependence on God (Pippen might still have this property extrinsically 
because of his dependence on Jordan). So two individuals can have the same property extrinsically, and 
both because of an explanatory factor had extrinsically, but the explanatory factors need not be the same.  
extrinsic. But in the absence of arguments that the I/E distinction must satisfy a kind of 
law of excluded middle, and that there is a non-arbitrary reason to classify properties with 
“mixed” instances on one side of the distinction rather than the other, it is hard to see 
which side, if either, is correct. An alternative solution would be to allow that the I/E 
distinction comes in degrees, such that a property is intrinsic (extrinsic) if most of its 
instances are had intrinsically (extrinsically), assuming some way of counting instances. 
But this solution would tie the I/E distinction to the I-ly/E-ly distinction in a way that 
would mark a sharp departure from the a priori methods used so far. 
 Before elaborating on the empirical element of this model in the following 
section, I should note briefly how it applies to disjunctive and conjunctive properties and 
to the philosophical tasks for which the I/E distinction has been used. 
 In the case of disjunctive properties, the relevance parameters are those that hold 
for each disjunct when it is had individually (not as a disjunct). For example, a 
relevantly-lonely red square can have the property of being red or relevantly-
accompanied either intrinsically or extrinsically, depending on whether colors can be had 
intrinsically or extrinsically (which in turn depends ultimately on our best explanation of 
color). A relevantly-accompanied blue square presumably would have this disjunctive 
property extrinsically, depending just on the property’s definition (assuming, reasonably, 
that no further explanation is wanted). For conjunctive properties, the relevance 
parameters for how a conjunctive property is had are not so reducible. The property of 
being red and relevantly-accompanied would be had extrinsically by a relevantly-
accompanied red square (on the assumption that no further explanation of how it has this 
property is wanted). What is crucial to keep in mind, in both cases, is whether there is a 
reason to posit an additional explanatory property, and, if so, how that property is had. As 
noted, it is a consequence of the model that we cannot invariably infer from a property’s 
definition whether it is had intrinsically or else extrinsically in particular cases.  
 As for how this model affects the philosophical tasks to which the I/E distinction 
has been put, its use in clarifying the real vs. mere Cambridge change distinction will 
serve as an illustration. According to Geach, Cambridge changes are changes in the 
predicates true of a thing.37 All changes are Cambridge changes, but some are such that 
(a) there is a change of predicates true of a thing and (b) there is a real change in the 
thing. A change that satisfies (a) and (b) is a real change, while a change that satisfies 
only (a) is a mere Cambridge change. For example, when Socrates dies, there is a real 
change in Socrates but a mere Cambridge change in Xanthippe, who becomes a widow.  
 The I/E distinction has been used to explain this difference: real changes are 
changes in intrinsic properties, while mere Cambridge changes are changes in extrinsic 
properties. However, this explanation is too quick: some properties that may be classified 
as intrinsic by their definition, such as shape, may be had extrinsically. The above model 
provides the means for a more precise understanding of the real/mere Cambridge change 
distinction. The model allows us to distinguish between two claims: real changes are 
those that involve changes in properties had intrinsically, or real changes are those that 
involve physical changes in a thing. The first option seems unjustified except insofar as it 
is implicitly assumed to be a variant of the latter. The latter option makes the real/mere 
Cambridge change distinction compatible with what physical theory tells us about how 
things have their physical properties. For whether physical changes are changes in 
properties a thing has intrinsically or else extrinsically depends on physical theory, not on 
                                                
37 Peter Geach, God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969): 70-72. 
property definitions.38 The upshot is that we can no longer strictly identify real change 
with change in intrinsic properties, but we can say that real change is typically (but not by 
definition) a change in the properties a thing has intrinsically. The I/E distinction would 
remain a reliable indicator of the real/mere Cambridge change distinction. 
 
VI. Elaborating The Basic Model: Causes and Conditions, Constancy and Mutability 
 It may seem that by using dispositions as an illustrative case of explanatory 
properties, I have made the I-ly/E-ly distinction dependent on the I/E distinction, since 
dispositions are widely considered to be intrinsic properties. But there is no circularity 
here, because dispositions – and any other explanatory property – are subject to the I-
ly/E-ly distinction too. A disposition can be had intrinsically or else extrinsically even if 
they are all classified as intrinsic properties.39 One way a sports fan could be wrong about 
Michael Jordan is if it turns out that he has his disposition, or the physical properties that 
explain it, extrinsically. The basic model could be elaborated to distinguish between the 
ways in which properties are had according to our “folk” intuitions about the natural 
world and the ways in which they are had according to our best physical theories. I have 
not done so for two reasons: first, “folk” intuitions are updated in the face of physical 
                                                
38 Jacovides suggests that real change involves a change in fundamental explanatory properties. Carol E. 
Cleland, “The Difference Between Real Change and Mere Cambridge Change”, Philosophical Studies 60 
(1990): 257-280, argues that they involve changes in dispositions posited by physics. 
39There may well be extrinsic dispositions (e.g., see Jennifer McKitrick, “A Case for Extrinsic 
Dispositions”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 155-174), although that is an I/E claim about 
which I remain neutral. But well-known counterexamples to a simple conditional analysis of dispositions 
also may be considered cases where a disposition that is classified as intrinsic is had extrinsically (e.g., the 
finked wire in C.B. Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals”, The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 1-8, 
or the gold challice in Mark Johnston, “How to Speak of the Colors”, Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 221-
263. According to a simple conditional analysis, an object is disposed to M when C iff it would M if it were 
the case that C (Michael Fara, “Dispositions”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/dispositions/. 
Further discussion of these possibilities must be left for another occasion. 
theory, although not always or immediately; second, the role of explanatory properties in 
the I-ly/E-ly distinction would not change.  
 It also seems that we are willing to allow some slippage when drawing I-ly/E-ly 
distinctions. For example, if we are willing to say that some physical objects are square, 
then we also ought to be willing to say that some physical objects have their squareness 
intrinsically. That is, if being square is a property that can be had by physical objects, 
then a physical object’s being square intrinsically will be acceptable to a similar extent. 
Ellis seems to take this for granted in his steel band example. This vagueness does not 
undermine the I-ly/E-ly account any more than it forces us to deny that some physical 
objects are squares. 
 However, bringing empirical theory into the picture raises other problems, nicely 
illustrated by hydrangeas.40 A difference in soil pH determines the flowers’ color by 
affecting the aluminum content in the plant. If the soil is acidic, the flowers are blue, and 
if it is basic they are pink – the opposite of litmus paper. So do a hydrangea’s flowers 
have their color extrinsically, or are they just caused to have their color by the soil pH? In 
general, given that empirical theory can determine whether a property is had intrinsically 
or else extrinsically, how do we distinguish an external cause of a thing’s having a 
property and an external condition that determines whether it has the property 
intrinsically or extrinsically? I’ll address this problem in steps. 
                                                
40 See http://hgic.clemson.edu/factsheets/HGIC1067.htm, downloaded on June 2, 2008. Many thanks to 
Amy Hurshman for this example. 
 To begin with, the problem is not that of the well-known context-relativity or 
vagueness between a cause and a condition.41 It is relative to our explanatory purposes 
which factor in a total cause we pick out as a sufficient cause (e.g., the match’s being lit) 
and which as a necessary cause or condition (e.g., the presence of oxygen). These 
differences between causal factors highlighted as causes and those treated as background 
conditions are reflected in ordinary counterfactual reasoning.42 A chemist seeking to 
discover the nature of a hydrangea’s color might try to isolate a sufficient external cause. 
If when the soil pH is changed from its original state, the hydrangea’s new flowers 
bloomed in a different color, he might conclude that the soil pH is a sufficient external 
cause of their color, relegating the other factors to background conditions. But this is not 
sufficient for the hydrangea to have its color extrinsically. That depends on whether the 
same flowers would change color whenever soil pH changes – for example, from pink to 
blue when switched from basic to acidic soil, and back again to pink if replaced in basic 
soil. It is this sort of dependence on external conditions that matters in the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction and that must be distinguished from external causes.  
 We can begin to illuminate the nature of this dependence with the following case. 
Suppose we inject a hydrangea with permanent pink dye such that all its flowers would 
remain pink through any change in soil pH. Does it have its color intrinsically? We might 
say, with Plato, that the dye is pink intrinsically but the hydrangea is pink because it 
contains the dye, and hence it is pink extrinsically. On this view, although the dye is 
constantly present and spatiotemporally internal, it counts as external to the plant in terms 
                                                
41 John L. Mackie, “Causes and Conditions”, in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., Causation (New York: 
Oxford, 1993): 33-55, reprinted from American Philosophical Quarterly 2/4 (October 1965): 245-55, 261-
4. 
42 See N’gbala and Branscombe, “Mental Simulation and Causal Attribution: When Simulating an Event 
Does Not Affect Fault Assignment” and Wells and Gavanski, “Mental Simulation of Causality”. 
of its nature. (This is the other sense of internal/external I mention in fn.9.) But there is 
another option: we could say the dye is now part of the hydrangea’s nature because of its 
permanence. Its constancy in the face of relevant external change might justify the claim 
that it has its color intrinsically, even though its color had an external cause and it is the 
only hydrangea to have its color in this way. 
 Our background knowledge about plants would probably lead us to side with 
Plato in this case; more precisely, our modal intuitions about plants and their properties 
would follow the natural-law constraint. But there may be no principled way to determine 
when a constant condition that had an external cause becomes part of a thing’s nature, 
and hence makes it or any property explained by that condition a property it has 
intrinsically, or whether the constant condition forever remains external to the thing’s 
nature (wherever it might be spatiotemporally located) and makes it or any property 
explained by that condition a property it has extrinsically. In the case of weight, we 
automatically choose the latter route, perhaps because gravity or other physical forces are 
not divisible and so are not even candidates for becoming part of an individual’s nature 
the way a dram of dye can be. This does not undermine the model so much as prompt 
further inquiry into any general principles under which a constant condition either 
remains or ceases to be external to a thing’s nature. Acquired dispositions are good test 
cases. 
 But there is an important distinction that this discussion has elided so far, brought 
out by the following case. Assume that pain is always had intrinsically, on the assumption 
(granted for the sake of argument) that we identify pain with pain qualia. If I always wear 
a cilice that causes pain (like the character Silas in The Da Vinci Code), there is a 
constant external condition that is sufficient for my pain. Do I have my pain 
extrinsically? No, because what matters in the I-ly/E-ly distinction is mutability, and 
mutability and constancy lie on distinct continua. Mutability is a modal notion; it is that 
feature of some aspects of reality by which they are altered in counterfactual reasoning 
more or less easily or often. The natural-law and availability constraints are constraints 
on mutability. Constancy is a temporal notion. The cilice is a constant external condition, 
but it is highly mutable: I could remove it at any time if I so chose. Dependency on an 
condition that is constant, rather than immutable, does not determine that a property 
explained by the presence of that condition is had extrinsically.  
 The same principle holds for the dyed hydrangea. By assumption the dye is 
immutable, and not merely constant, once injected; its immutability, not its constancy, 
makes it a candidate for becoming part of the hydrangea’s nature. The term “permanent” 
is ambiguous between these notions. The cilice case also reflects the difference between 
mutability and constancy, in a more subtle way. In that case, our automatic response is to 
think of it as remaining external to my nature no matter how long and constantly I wear 
it. For without this response, the cilice case would not present a problem to considering 
the pain as something that I have intrinsically. And it is the fact that it is highly mutable, 
despite its constancy, that makes it ineligible for being considered part of my nature – in 
sharp contrast to the psychological disposition I have that explains why I always wear it. 
Thus, the cilice remains a constant external condition (or sufficient cause) of my pain; it 
is neither an immutable external condition (which would make my pain something I have 
extrinsically) nor an immutable part of my nature (which would make my pain something 
I have intrinsically in an atypical way). So I do have my pain intrinsically in the intuition- 
sanctioned way, given the identification of pain and pain-qualia. 
 The Falstaff/Hal case also shows how mutability and constancy come apart. 
Falstaff need not be constantly in Hal’s presence for Hal’s wittiness to depend on 
Falstaff’s in the relevant sense. What matters is whether Hal’s wittiness is mutable in the 
relevant counterfactual situations, given Falstaff’s claim that he himself is the relevant 
external object (external to Hal). From Falstaff’s perspective – which is the one that 
matters, given that it is he who is drawing the distinction – the answer is clearly yea. 
 
Concluding Remarks. 
 I have proposed an analysis of the distinction immediately motivated by our 
intuitions that properties can be had intrinsically or else extrinsically: the I-ly/E-ly 
distinction. The basic difference between this distinction and the I/E distinction is that the 
former depends on a posteriori as well as a priori ways of determining which objects and 
worlds are relevant for classifying the ways in which properties are had. I also argue that 
the I-ly/E-ly distinction is used for explanatory purposes, and that the counterfactual 
reasoning that supports it falls within the purview of empirical studies on the nature of 
and constraints guiding ordinary counterfactual reasoning in general. I further propose a 
model for understanding the relation between the I/E and I-ly/E-ly distinctions that 
explains the puzzle of cross-classification: how intrinsic properties can be had 
extrinsically and vice versa. Finally, I suggest how the model affects the philosophical 
tasks for which the I/E distinction has been used, and elaborate on it in response to some 
puzzling cases.  
